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JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is as set 
forth in Appellant's brief and is not disputed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The issues on appeal are substantively those set forth 
in Appellant's brief, i.e. whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to give one instruction requested by 
plaintiff, and in allowing defendants' expert accident 
reconstructionist to testify. However, the statement of the 
issues in Appellant's brief excludes key factual points on the 
first issue and adds inaccurate factual points on the second 
issue. A more germane statement of the issues is as follows: 
ISSUE I: DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION INFORMALLY REQUESTED BY 
PLAINTIFF, WHICH WAS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 51 OR WITH THE PRETRIAL ORDER, WHERE THE TRIAL COURT 
CONCLUDED THAT THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS 
ADEQUATELY COVERED BY OTHER INSTRUCTIONS? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
As indicated in Appellant's brief, the trial court has 
discretion in deciding whether to give a requested instruction, 
and the Court of Appeals may reverse the trial court's Judgment 
only in the case of an abuse of discretion. E.g., Pearce v. 
Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah 1985). The PreTrial Order 
governs the trial, Citizens Cas. Co. v. Hackett. 17 Utah 2d 304, 
410 P.2d 767 (1965), and the trial court has discretion in 
enforcing the PreTrial Order, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 16(d). 
ISSUE II: DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ALLOWING DEFENDANTS7 EXPERT WITNESS (ACCIDENT 
RECONSTRUCTIONIST) TO TESTIFY, WHERE DEFENDANTS7 COUNSEL HAD 
DISCLOSED THE IDENTITY OF THAT WITNESS AT THE PRETRIAL SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE, THERE WAS NO COURT ORDER REQUIRING THE DESIGNATION OF 
WITNESSES, PLAINTIFF7S COUNSEL HAD NEVER SOUGHT A MOTION TO 
COMPEL ON INTERROGATORIES PERTAINING TO THE PARTIES7 WITNESSES, 
AND THE PRETRIAL ORDER REFLECTED THE NAME OF THAT WITNESS? 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This issue is also governed by an abuse of discretion, 
as set forth in Appellant7s brief. Id. Berrett v. Denver and 
Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., Inc.. 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App. 1992) 
(the appellate court shall not "interfere with a trial court's 
case management unless its actions amount to an abuse of 
discretion"; a trial court may not exclude witnesses from 




Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 16(d): 
(d) Sanctions, If a party or a party's 
attorney fails to obey a scheduling or 
pretrial order . . . the court, upon motion 
or its own initiative, may make such orders 
with regard thereto as are just, and among 
others, any of the orders provided in 
Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D) . • . . 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 51: 
At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time as the court reasonably directs, 
any party may file written requests that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in said requests. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case arose out of a double automobile 
accident on October 12, 1988. The first collision occurred when 
a vehicle driven by the sixteen-year-old defendant, Scott 
Shipley, slipped on a wet road and came to a near stop; a vehicle 
driven by a third party collided with it and forced it across the 
roadway in front of a vehicle driven by plaintiff. Defendants 
presented a defense that defendant's actions were not negligent 
with regard to plaintiff, and that defendant's actions did not 
cause plaintiff's injuries. 
3 
2. A PreTrial Scheduling Conference was held on 
October 6, 1992; the case was tried to a jury from January 4-7, 
1993. 
3. Plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel, Ned Siegfried, 
became aware that defendant had retained Ronald Probert as an 
expert accident reconstructionist no later than the PreTrial 
Scheduling Conference of October 6, 1992• In that Scheduling 
Conference, the following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Do you have any other experts 
lined up at this point? 
MR. DAVIES: I think we will probably use an 
accident reconstructionist. I have talked to 
Mr. Ron Probert about that. 
4. At the PreTrial Conference, the court instructed 
counsel to exchange witness lists if their witnesses were 
different from those disclosed during the PreTrial Conference. 
The court gave counsel the following verbal instructions at the 
PreTrial Scheduling Conference: 
THE COURT: . . . I would like a proposed 
PreTrial Order to me by December 21, and I 
would like you to prepare that, 
Mr. Siegfried. That may not be complicated, 
just set out the issues and the witnesses 
that you each intend to call. I would like a 
list of witnesses to be exchanged between you 
two by the — you should know that by 
November 2 so that there is no surprise. 
That will give you time if you need to depose 
one before then, you could do that. 
4 
MR. SIEGFRIED: Okay. 
THE COURT: But I don't anticipate your 
witnesses would be much different than those 
we have discussed here today. If they are, 
you should notify each other immediately. 
R. 765 (Partial Transcript of PreTrial Scheduling Conference, 
October 6, 1992) . 
5. The court entered no written order requiring the 
designation of expert witnesses by any specified date. Although 
the court asked counsel to exchange witness lists of any 
witnesses not designated during the PreTrial Scheduling 
Conference, defendants' counsel designated Mr. Probert at that 
time, so further designation was unnecessary. 
6. Because counsel for plaintiff did not submit a 
PreTrial Order as instructed by the court, counsel for defendant 
prepared a proposed PreTrial Order (see Addendum) and submitted 
it for consideration on December 21, 1992. That proposed 
PreTrial Order again listed Mr. Ronald Probert as defendant's 
expert witness. R. 2 62. As the court has noted, there was no 
objection to that proposed PreTrial Order from plaintiff's 
counsel, so the court signed the Order. R. 650 (Hearing on 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial, May 25, 1993). 
7. Both parties owed Answers to Interrogatories to 
one another, but neither party ever sent formally signed Answers. 
Counsel for defendants had offered to provide his clients' signed 
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Answers to Interrogatories, if plaintiff would also submit his 
signed Answers to defendants' Interrogatories, However, 
plaintiff failed to submit those responses and so defendant did 
not submit his either• Furthermore, neither party filed a Motion 
to Compel Discovery, to force the issue. 
8. Counsel for plaintiff first objected to defendants 
calling Ronald Probert as an expert witness on the first day of 
trial, January 4, 1993, by way of a Motion in Limine. R. 659 
(Arguments on Motions in Limine immediately prior to commencement 
of trial, January 4, 1993). In making that motion, plaintiff's 
counsel (John Fay) stated that the first notice that his office 
had of defendants' expert, Ronald Probert, was on December 18, 
1992. Id. Counsel for defendant responded that he had notified 
plaintiff's counsel (Mr. Siegfried) that he would call Ron 
Probert as an expert witness either at the PreTrial or shortly 
thereafter, and that defendants' counsel had also offered 
plaintiff's counsel the opportunity to depose Mr. Probert 
one-and-a-half to two months earlier. R. 660-61. The court, 
Judge Page, stated that his notes from the PreTrial "were that 
the defendant indicated at that time [the PreTrial Scheduling 
Conference] that Ron Probert would be the accident 
reconstructionist . . . and so I do not find that these witnesses 
come as any surprise to the plaintiff." R. 662. The court also stated: 
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Further the Court would find that if you 
wished to do anything about it prior to 
today's date, you should have done it and not 
wait until today's date and then come in with 
these motions to exclude them and I will deny 
both of these motions. 
Id. 
9. Plaintiff's proposed Jury Instructions submitted 
in accordance with the PreTrial Order did not contain the 
proposed instruction upon which plaintiff now bases part of his 
appeal. R. 213-16. In fact, counsel has been unable to locate 
the requested instruction as part of the court record, presumably 
because it was not properly submitted as a formal Request. That 
instruction was proposed and submitted informally to the court 
and to defense counsel on the last day of trial. R. 615 (Partial 
Transcript regarding Discussion on Jury Instructions, January 7, 
1993) . 
10. The only information that plaintiff's counsel gave 
to the court regarding the supposed need for that instruction 
occurred during two parts of the discussion in chambers regarding 
jury instructions, just prior to the court's instructing the jury 
and holding closing arguments. Counsel for plaintiff, John Fay, 
made the following two comments: 
MR. FAY: . . . I do have one or two other 
things, additional ones. I presented 
Mr. Davies with an instruction concerning a 
minor engaged in an adult activity that I 
would like to be given. 
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R. 615. Later during that discussion in chambers, the following 
exchange occurred: 
THE COURT: Do you, Mr. Fay, wish to take any 
exceptions to the Court's proposed Jury 
Instructions? 
MR. FAY: Only in the sense, your Honor, that 
I wanted one or two instructions that I 
thought were appropriate and the Court has 
refused and I would take exception to that, 
and that is my jury instruction concerning a 
minor engaging in an adult activity, that the 
minor has to be held to the standard of the 
adult in that activity. 
R. 634. 
11. At the trial of this matter, the court gave ten 
different instructions to the jury touching on the issue of 
negligence and standard of care. Those were Jury Instructions 
Nos. 14, 15, 16, 19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28. R. 164-66, 169, 
173-78 (see Addendum). Those instructions gave specific 
information to the jury about the standard of care applicable to 
the driver of a motor vehicle. None of those instructions state 
that a minor is held to less than an adult standard of care in 
driving a motor vehicle. 
12. Following the discussion in chambers regarding 
proposed jury instructions and the court's refusal to give the 
proposed instruction requested by plaintiff's counsel, R. 635, 
the court instructed the jury and counsel gave closing argument. 
The closing argument of defendants' counsel focused on issues of 
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proximate cause and damages, but defense counsel's argument did 
contain some references to the appropriateness of the 
sixteen-year-old defendant's driving at the time of the accident. 
Plaintiff's counsel did not object to any of those references. 
R. 582-603 (Transcript of Closing Arguments, January 7, 1993). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Plaintiff failed to submit the proposed instruction 
about which he now complains pursuant to a proper written request 
as required by Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
request did not comply with the requirements of the PreTrial 
Order, either. The court's refusal to give the instruction was 
not an abuse of discretion because the requested instruction was 
untimely, duplicative, potentially confusing, and incomplete in 
its statement of the law. The instructions given by the court, 
taken as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on the 
plaintiff's theory of the case. 
II. Plaintiff's counsel was aware of the identity and 
availability for a deposition, of defendant's expert accident 
reconstructionist at the time of the PreTrial Scheduling 
Conference three months before trial. Defendants' counsel 
complied with the court's order in designating that witness both 
at the PreTrial Conference and in the PreTrial Order. Therefore, 
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plaintiff, was not prejudiced by the court's allowing that 
witness to testify. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, FAIRLY 
APPRISED THE JURY OF THE STANDARD OF CARE APPLICABLE 
TO DEFENDANT SCOTT SHIPLEY. 
A. The Trial Court May Refuse to Give an Instruction if it 
is Unnecessary or Substantially Covered by Other 
Instructions. 
The Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have 
repeatedly addressed the standard applicable to the trial court's 
refusal to give the requested jury instruction. For example, in 
Goode v. Dayton Disposal, Inc., 738 P.2d 638, 640-41 (Utah 1987), 
the court ruled: 
[T]he jury will be deemed to have been 
properly instructed when the jury 
instructions, taken as a whole, adequately 
set forth the law applicable to the issues to 
be determined by the jury. The fact that a 
requested instruction accurately states the 
relevant law does not require that the 
instruction be given, provided its substance 
was included elsewhere in the instructions. 
Accord. Watters v. Query. 626 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Utah 1981); 
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 533 (Utah 1979); Black v. 
McKnight, 562 P.2d 621, 622 (Utah 1979); Harmon v. Sprouse-Reitz 
Co., 21 Utah 361, 445 P.2d 773, 774 (1968) (requested instruction 
"substantially covered" by instructions "taken as a whole"); 
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Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734, 735 (1964); 
Ostler v, Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 
1987), cert, denied 795 P.2d 1138; Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 
80, 82 (Utah App. 1987) (specific proposed instruction on 
negligence per se and emergency were adequately covered by more 
general instructions). 
Several cases have applied this issue more specifically 
in automobile accident cases involving personal injuries, holding 
that the trial court need not give specific requested 
instructions pertaining to discrete liability issues if the 
substance of the requested instruction is covered by more general 
liability instructions. For example, in Lee v. Howes, 548 P.2d 
619 (Utah 1976), the plaintiff requested a specific instruction 
that the area where the accident occurred was a residential area 
and that the driver "had a duty to exercise care for the presence 
of children reasonably to be expected in or near the street in 
such an area." Id. at 621. However, the court concluded that: 
The situation was fairly and amply covered by 
the court's instructions. They included the 
standard definition of negligence: that the 
driver must exercise the degree of care which 
a reasonable and prudent person would under 
the circumstances; and that he must have due 
regard for the existing conditions of the 
road, the traffic thereon, the actual and 
potential hazards; and must keep a proper 
lookout, and control of her car. 
Id. 
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Similarly, in Maltby v, Cox Constr. Co,. Inc., 598 P.2d 
336 (Utah 1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 945, the plaintiff 
requested an instruction that if a driver collided with another 
vehicle stopped or slowing on the highway in front of him, that 
is "some evidence" that the driver was driving at too high a 
speed or following too closely. The Court concluded that this 
instruction was properly refused in light of the other 
instructions defining the duties and responsibilities of the 
parties, including keeping a proper lookout, keeping the vehicle 
under control and using reasonable care under the circumstances. 
Accord. Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah App. 1987). 
B. Plaintiff's Proposed Instruction is Not Part of the 
Record, and Was Not in Compliance With Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 51 or the PreTrial Order* 
In the case at bar, plaintiff's requested jury 
instruction was not properly submitted pursuant to a written 
Request. It is not even part of the record on appeal, and 
therefore should not be considered by the Court of Appeals. 
However, if the Court does elect to address it, plaintiff's 
argument fails in any event. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits a 
party to request jury instructions by filing "written requests 
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said 
requests." The instruction that the plaintiff wished to have 
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given, and about which plaintiff currently complains, was not 
made in that manner. It was submitted in writing, but informally 
and without an attached pleading or written Request. A written 
proposed instruction does not constitute a written Request in 
compliance with Rule 51. 
In addition, the plaintiff did not request that 
instruction in compliance with the PreTrial Order, which provided 
that counsel were submitting proposed jury instructions on 
December 21, 1992, and that "no additional requests for 
instructions are contemplated, unless counsel can demonstrate a 
need to address unanticipated legal or factual issues arising 
during trial." PreTrial Order, R. 260. The instruction that 
plaintiff requested did not involve an "unanticipated legal or 
factual" issue, nor did counsel for plaintiff seek to demonstrate 
a need to address an unanticipated legal or factual issue in 
making the request. Accordingly, that instruction was not 
submitted in compliance with the PreTrial Order governing the 
trial of this case. 
C. Plaintiff Cannot Establish that the Instructions Given 
Misled the Jury or Failed to Instruct Them Properly on 
the Law. 
More importantly, though, even if a request for the 
subject instruction had been properly made, plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the jury instructions actually given, taken 
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together, did not properly instruct the jury on the law; further, 
plaintiff must show that the information in the requested 
instruction was not given in other instructions. Madsen v. 
Brown, 701 P.2d 1986, 1092 (Utah 1985); Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hardware Co,, 631 P.2d 865, 871 (Utah 1981); Maltbv v. Cox 
Constr. Co., Inc., 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979) (cert, denied 100 
S.Ct. 306); Meier v. Christensen. 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734, 
735 (1964); Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 
451 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied 795 P.2d 1138. 
The court accurately stated, in refusing to give that 
instruction, that the other instructions adequately apprised the 
jury of the law. As set forth in the Statement of Facts, the 
court gave ten instructions regarding negligence and standard of 
care. (See Addendum.) All of those instructions are regularly 
used in cases involving adults. None of those instructions 
stated that defendant Scott Shipley would be held to less than an 
adult standard of care. In fact, several of those instructions 
advised the jury about the standard of care applicable to the 
driver of a motor vehicle (without any reference to age or 
experience)• The requested instruction would not have added 
appreciably to the instructions that were in fact given. 
Plaintiff now contends that counsel for defendants 
attempted to take advantage of this in both opening statement and 
14 
closing argument. However, counsel for plaintiff made no 
objection to any statements made by counsel for defendants in 
opening or closing, and therefore failed to provide the court 
with any opportunity to correct a misstatement, if one in fact 
occurred, during either opening or closing. Plaintiff also 
failed to preserve any objection that could have been made. 
However, procedural issues aside, counsel for defendants in 
closing only relied on the content of Jury Instruction No. 14, 
which is a Model Utah Jury Instruction - MUJI 3.2. That 
instruction, which is based on accepted Utah case law, JIFU 
Instructions and BAJI Instructions, provides that reasonable care 
is what an ordinary, prudent person uses in similar situations, 
that reasonableness depends on the situation, and that the jury 
must decide what "a prudent person with similar knowledge would 
do in a similar situation." R 164. Counsel for defendants 
simply argued in closing argument that the jury must take into 
account the specific situation with which defendant Scott Shipley 
was confronted, and determine "what a prudent person with similar 
knowledge" would have done in that same situation. In evaluating 
"a prudent person with similar knowledge", the jury is entitled 
to consider attributes applicable to the defendant, including his 
age. This does not mean that a different standard of care 
applies to a sixteen-year-old driver. It does mean that in 
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applying the universally accepted standard to any defendant, the 
jury can take the party's circumstances, including age, into 
account in accessing negligence. Furthermore, if counsel for 
plaintiff felt that the jury had been misled by any statements 
made by counsel for defendants, counsel for plaintiff not only 
could have objected to such, but also had the opportunity in 
closing argument to make a contrary argument. 
D. Although Sixteen-Year Old Drivers May be Held to an 
Adult Standard of Care, the Application of That 
Standard Allows Consideration of the Circumstances of 
the Alleged Negligence. Including the Driver's Age and 
Driving Experience, 
The one Utah case most directly addressing this issue 
was the 194 0 Utah Supreme Court case of Nelson v. Arrowhead 
Freight Lines, LTD, 104 P.2d 225 (Utah 1940). This opinion dealt 
with two cases, one of which involved a sixteen-year-old 
passenger in an automobile, who purportedly violated provisions 
of the Utah Motor Vehicle Code by blocking the vision of the 
driver. The issues on appeal included the question of whether a 
sixteen-year-old should be held to an adult standard of care. 
The court noted that young people over the age of fourteen years 
are normally presumed to be held to an adult standard of care and 
that a presumption of adult responsibility attaches to young 
people old enough to operate a motor vehicle. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court also found that even though an adult standard of 
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care applies, that a jury may consider all facts and 
circumstances surrounding the automobile collision, including the 
age of the driver. 
In Nelson, counsel for the heirs of the 
sixteen-year-old decedent had requested an instruction advising 
the jury that the sixteen-year-old decedent should be held to a 
lesser standard of care.1 The Court found that whether or not 
that such an instruction would have been helpful, that it was not 
necessary because the jury was adequately instructed by the jury 
instructions as a whole. Specifically, the court told the jury 
that it could consider all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the collision, which the Utah Supreme Court 
interpreted to include the decedent's age. 
As indicated above the court instructed the 
jury that it "must find and determine from 
all the facts and circumstances shown to 
exist at the time of the collision herein 
whether either of the occupants, Paul E. 
Nelson or Ramona Smith [the sixteen year old 
decedent], was guilty of contributory 
lrThe Court stated: "Plaintiff's second assignment is based 
upon the court's refusal to give plaintiffs' requested Instruction 
No. 3, which reads: 'You are instructed, members of the jury, that 
contributory negligence is the want of ordinary care and prudence 
on the part of person injured, contributing directly and 
proximately to the injury complained of. In this connection you 
are instructed that Ramona Smith [the sixteen year old decedent] 
was required to exercise only that degree of care and caution which 
persons of like age, capacity and experience might be reasonably 
expected to naturally and ordinarily use in the same situation and 
under like circumstances.' 
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negligence in becoming a passenger in the 
Ford coupe along with the driver and other 
occupants therein. (Italics added,) 
Those facts and circumstances included the 
fact of age of the deceased, physical and 
mental development, general past experiences, 
and all matters which would have been before 
them had the requested instructions been 
given. We do not hold that the requested 
instruction was improper nor that it might 
not have been better to give it. What we do 
hold is that in view of the record and the 
instructions given, the failure of the court 
to give the requested instruction is not 
reversible error. 
104 P.2d at 229. 
In the case before this Court, the jury was properly 
instructed and was given more than adequate instructions to 
apprise them of the standard of care applicable to the defendant, 
Scott Shipley. There has been no sufficient showing that the 
jury was misled in any way by the instructions given. 
Considering the instructions that were in fact given in their 
entirety, the jury had all the tools that they needed to render a 
proper and fair decision herein. 
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POINT II 
A PARTY'S WITNESSES MAY NOT BE EXCLUDED AT 
TRIAL UNLESS THAT PARTY HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH A COURT 
ORDER REGARDING DESIGNATION OF WITNESSES. 
Plaintiff complains that counsel for defendants failed 
to disclose the names of his expert accident reconstructionist at 
a required time before trial. Counsel for defendant specifically 
disclosed the identity of that expert, Ronald Probert, at the 
PreTrial Scheduling Conference. Furthermore, no court order was 
ever entered requiring an additional designation of expert 
witnesses, except in the PreTrial Order. 
In response to an additional request for these names of 
defendants' experts, counsel for defendants voluntarily submitted 
those names, again, in his letter of December 18, 1992 to Ned 
Siegfried. This designation was repeated once more in the 
PreTrial Order. Therefore, not only is there no order requiring 
a designation, but counsel for plaintiff was aware of that expert 
in any event. 
In the case of Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. 
Co., Inc.. 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of Appeals 
ruled that even though "trial courts have broad discretion in 
managing the cases assigned to their courts" and that the Court 
of Appeals would not "interfere with a trial court's case 
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management unless its actions amount to an abuse of discretion," 
id, at 293, a trial court may not exclude witnesses from 
testifying absent a specific order with a specific deadline for 
designating witnesses• The Court of Appeals stated: 
We hold that absent an order creating a 
judicially imposed deadline, a trial court 
may not sanction a party by excluding its 
witnesses under Rule 37(b)(2). 
Id. at 196 (citations omitted). 
A reading of the court's comments at the PreTrial 
Scheduling Conference shows that the court's instructions in this 
regard were less than crystal clear. Although the court said 
that the parties should know who the witnesses would be by 
November 2, 1992, he also stated that counsel should designate 
their witnesses immediately if different from those stated during 
the PreTrial Scheduling Conference. Because no formal Order was 
entered regarding such designations, the court's verbal and 
somewhat confusing instructions during that Conference can hardly 
be construed as an order. In any event, the trial court's 
interpretation of his own instructions was that defendants' 
counsel gave proper notice of his witnesses to plaintiff's 
counsel and that plaintiff was not prejudiced. 
Given the standard set forth in the Berrett case, and 
given that the trial court in this matter used his discretion to 
allow the witnesses to testify as normally should be permitted, 
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the Court of Appeals should not find any error in the trial 
court's decision to permit this witness to testify under these 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's informally requested instruction regarding 
standard of care was not made in compliance with Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 51, nor did it comply with the terms of the 
PreTrial Order. In addition, on substantive grounds, the jury 
was given full and fair instructions regarding negligence and 
standard of care, and the requested instruction would have added 
nothing to the jury's deliberations. Even assuming that a 
sixteen-year old driver is held to an adult standard of care, the 
application of that standard permits the jury to consider the 
circumstances of the alleged negligence, including the driver's 
age and experience. 
The court's decision to allow defendants' expert 
witnesses to testify was proper, because counsel for plaintiff 
was apprised months before the actual trial as to the identity of 
defendants' expert witness. Furthermore, there was no order 
requiring a formal disclosure of those witnesses, and without 
such a specific order, witnesses cannot be prevented from 
testifying at trial. 
21 
The jury's decision herein was supported by the 
testimony and evidence. The plaintiff had an opportunity to a 
full and fair trial, the jury was properly instructed and 
properly deliberated, so the jury's findings and the court's 
Judgment must stand. 
Defendants/Appellees respectfully request that the 
Court of Appeals affirm the trial court's Judgment based on the 
Jury Verdict herein. 
DATED this '> -~ day of March, 1994. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
i^m/s. DAVIES 
(ttg/rneys for Defendants and 
Appellees Scot t G. Shipley and 
Stephen P. Shipley 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage 
prepaid, on this _JJ£^~ day of March, 1994, to the following: 
6016-1074 
1sd\Summer.brf 
Ned P. Siegfried 
John Farrell Fay 
Jim Mouritsen 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South, 
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ADDENDUM 1 
LYNN S. DAVIES [A0824] 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
50 South Main Street 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY SUMMERILL, * 




SCOTT G. SHIPLEY and * 
STEPHEN P. SHIPLEY, * Civil No. 910750793 
* 
Defendants. * Judge Rodney S. Page 
The court, upon stipulation of counsel for the parties, 
enters the following Pretrial Order to govern the trial of this 
action: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this court, 
and are not disputed. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
2. This case arose out of an automobile accident 
involving vehicles driven by plaintiff Stanley Summerill and 
defendant Scott Shipley, at or near the intersection of Utah 
State Road 89 and State Road 272, Davis County, Utah on or about 
F i l m ?••,-
 r - ,. 
.... IL rJ Jo , . 
frr 
L C -
October 12, 1988. Plaintiff has brought this action against 
defendants Shipley for personal injuries that he claims to have 
sustained in that accident, seeking recovery of special and 
general damages. Defendant Steven Shipley is the father of 
defendant Scott Shipley and was allowing Scott Shipley to drive 
his vehicle at the time of the accident. 
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS; 
1. Plaintiff claims that defendant Scott Shipley was 
negligent in the following particulars: 
A speed too fast for conditions; improper lookout; 
failure to yield; loss of control of his automobile; failure to 
operate his automobile on the right side of the roadway; and 
failure to exercise reasonable care. 
2. Plaintiff claims that as a proximate cause of the 
defendant Scott Shipley's alleged negligence, he sustained 
personal injuries, for which he is entitled to damages against 
defendants Steven and Scott Shipley for the amount of his past 
and future medical expenses, for lost wages allegedly sustained 
by plaintiff Stanley Summerill, for general damages, for costs of 
suit, and for interest at the rate of 8 percent per annum for the 
date of collision on all special damages. 
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DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS: 
1. Defendant Scott Shipley has denied that he was 
negligent or that his conduct was the proximate cause of any 
injuries and damages sustained by plaintiff. 
2. Plaintiff's claims are barred or defendants are 
entitled to an offset to the extent of no-fault or other 
insurance payments. 
3. The accident was unavoidable or the result of 
events and circumstances beyond the control of defendant Scott 
Shipley. 
4. Defendants are liable only for defendant Scott 
Shipley's pro rata share of liability for plaintiff's injuries 
and damages, if any. 
5. Plaintiff's injuries and damages were proximately 
caused by the negligence of third persons over which defendants 
had no control or right of control, specifically the negligence 
of Steven Shumway. 
6. Plaintiff's injuries and damages were proximately 
caused by his own negligence. 
7. Defendants may be held liable only for defendant 
Scott Shipley's proportionate fault, if any. 
8. Plaintiff has failed to mitigate his damages. 
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9. Both plaintiff's comparative negligence and 
failure to mitigate consist, in part only, of his failure to wear 
a seat belt at the time of the accident• 
IS8UE8 OF FACT 
1. Was defendant Scott Shipley negligent in one or 
more of the particulars as alleged by plaintiff. 
2. If defendant Scott Shipley was negligent, was such 
negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries and damages, 
if any? 
3. Was plaintiff negligent? 
4. If so, was such negligence a proximate cause of 
the plaintiff's injuries? 
5. Was another driver (Steven Shumway) negligent? 
6. If so, was his negligence the proximate cause of 
plaintiff's injuries? 
7. If both defendant Scott Shipley, plaintiff Stanley 
Summerill and another driver (Shumway) were negligent, what was 
the proportionate share of each person's negligence in causing 
the accident and any injuries and damages resulting to plaintiff 
therefrom? 
8. Was the amount of reasonable and necessary medical 
expenses resulting from the accident were sustained by plaintiff? 
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hat mere p l a i n t i f f ' s l o s t wa | e s caused by the 
10, What are plaintiff's general damages? 
ISSUES OF LAW 
1 Tf plaintiff is entitled to recover, Is he 
entitled tn interest on ill special damages from the date ot tiie 
ii i i 11 11 i i i 1 )l PI I I i i i I i il I I j I i t i I In I in li 
expenses were incurred? (Utah Code Knri % 8-27-44 (1992) J, 
^
 U o e s Utah code Ann. § ;y-2y-44 (1 Ml (regarding 
interest on special damages) have retroactj u» elicMt? 
TRIAL DATE 
This case is scheduled for trial before a jury, as a 
first-place trial setting, tor January I, ' H , 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Counsel are submitting proposed Jury Instructions and 
y J i t 11 i i i1 yut\i I i i II in i einlj(j i I i i 11 i I )i i I i ( quei 13 
for instructions are contemplated, unless counsel can demonstrate 




Counsel are to submit proposed exhibits to the clerk at 
the beginning of trial. 
WITNESSES 
Plaintiff Summerill intends to call the following 
witnesses: 
Stanley Summerill, plaintiff. 
Scott G. Shipley, defendant. 
Stephen L. Shipley, defendant. 
Trooper Roger Spiegel, investigating officer. 
Lorin Summerill, plaintiff's father. 
Bob Sokol. 
EMT R. Rawley 
EMT Tom Reynolds 
William D. Ashworth, Jr., M.D. 
Lynn Robinson, M.D. 
Ralph B. Foley, M.D. 
Curtis Campbell, M.D. 
Gailen E. Lundell, D.C. 
Plaintiff specifically objects to the defendant calling 
any witnesses except Scott Shipley by deposition and any 
witnesses the plaintiff has named. 
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bet end ml U 1 i it1 • , 
Defendants reserve the riqht to eill any witnesses 
listed h' plaintiff Ihn deposition of Srott Shumway %n\\ be 
read, n Hditirn, defendants */1 I 1 t ilJ I »< i xper I .11 IM .bis: 
Ronald 1, Probert, accident reconstructionist, 
11
 l n null Mini r in ii r i 11 Lake CJ t 7 Utah 84121. 
Nathaniel M Nurd M O ~Pi» hast South Temple, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake <Mty, Utah R4L11. 
D e l P I I L I 11 i l 1 1 j i l l 
Steven L, Shumway. 
Chuck Goff. 
hill 1 ii 
), Marvin hpwis, M D. 
Michael 8. Coleman, M.L). 
Gary Symkoviak M 1 
Bard R. Madsen, M.D. 
W 1 t n P c ' S p ( 1 111- 1 M M I tin 1 P 1 lit f 1 1 
Defendants object tu plaint if t'o L ..tiling any witnesses 
nut listed above. 
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OTHER SCHEDULING MATTERS 
Counsel for plaintiff must submit copies of all 
exhibits supporting claims for special damages and a summary of 
special damages by Wednesday, December 23, 1992. 
SETTLEMENT 
Settlement prospects are poor. 
DATED this 3l£h day of (kco^L*- , 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Rodney S. Page 
Second District Court 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t a t r u e and c o r r e c t copy of the 
foregoi iKj i itsl i UIIHMI! i i iiiailnd hi l i i ' l < , | I <i jo pri'jhi I 
... th is or- day of UtLotix*. bo^, 1992, t o t h e fo l lowing counse l 
oi r e c o r d : 
Ned P. Siegfried 
John Farrell Fay 
SIEGFRIED k JENSEN 
310 East 4500 South Street, #620 





INSTRUCTION NO. '^ 
A person has i duty to use reasonable care to ivoid 
injuring other people or property "Negligence" simply means 
the failure to use reasonable ><ire. HeaGuni ib Lr »\ire does net 
require extraordinary caution or exceptional skiJl Reasonable 
1
 i r i ) - i h 11 J J i r 1 i n 11 | i J Ji n t person use;; in similar 
situations . 
The amount ot care that is considered "reasonable" 
lupL i J Mi J i u 11 i n i in urn »t J or i 1M Mil i i j j« nf JUM ^  n 
witn similar knowledge would do in i similar situation. 
Negligence may arise in actinq nr failinq to art. 
A part / whose in ) m H 5 J I danun J< I , \ < UJ ,* 1 I j in M M i 
party's negligent conduct may recover compensation from the 
rif |[i q^nt- f ill t ? i I I O S P \ n j
 u r i e s . 
INSTRUCTION NO- ^ 
The amount of care that is considered "reasonable" 
depends on the situation. Some situations require more caution 
because an ordinary person would understand that more danger is 
involved. In other situations, Less care is expected, such as 
where the risk of danger is lower or where the situation happens 
so suddenly that an ordinary person would not appreciate the 
danger. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ][* 
A reasonable careful person may assume that other people 
(ij are reasonably intelligent ' ^) ::.v *-  normal sight and 
hearing, an I i » uM I 1 < 1 >< , t i j * . * . . y o 11 e t u I 
However, i reasonably careful person may n it i.n.r a obvious 
risks created by other persons. 
INSTRUCTION NO. )l 
If you find that the defendant was negligent but that the 
plaintiff's injuries were caused by the act of a third person, 
and you also find that a reasonably prudent person in the 
defendant's situation could have foreseen the third person's act 
as a probable consequence of the defendant's negligence, then 
you may find the defendant liable to the plaintiff. However, if 
your finding is that a reasonably prudent person would not have 
foreseen the third person's act as a probable consequence of the 
defendant's negligence, then the defendant is not responsible 
for the plaintiff's injuries and your verdict should be for the 
defendant. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
It is the duty of every driver to use reasonable care to 
avoid danger. In that regard, every driver is obliged: 
1. To keep a lookout for other vehicles, and highway 
conditions which reasonably may be anticipated. 
2. To keep the vehicle under proper control. 
3. To drive at a safe speed, having proper regard for 
the width, surface and condition of the highway, other traffic, 
visibility, and any existing or potential hazards. • 
4. To drive in one lane whenever possible and to change 
lanes only after observing that it can be done safely and after 
giving the appropriate signal. 
5. to yield the right-of-way to any oncoming traffic 
when merging onto a freeway. 
INSTRUCTION NO- 7A 
It is the duty of the driver of any vehicle to exercise 
ordinary care at all times to avoid placing others in danger and 
to obey all statutes, ordinances, and rules of the road designed 
to promote safety. Failure to do so is negligence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
A violation of a safety law is evidence of negligence if 
it is shown that: 
1. The person injured belonged to a class of people the 
law intented to protect, and 
2. The law intended to protect against the type of harm 
which in fact occurred as a result of the violation. However, 
there are five exceptions: 
(1) When following the law would have created an 
even greater risk of harm. 
(2) When the person who violated that law was 
faced with an emergency that the person did not create, and the 
person could not follow the law. 
(3) When the person who violated the law made a 
reasonable effort to comply with the law, but was unable to 
comply. 
(4) When the person who violated the law could not 
comply with the law because the person was incapable of doing so. 
(5) When the person violating the law was 
incapable of understanding the requirements of the law. 
The person violating the law has the burden of proving 
one of the exceptions. If an exception is proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence, you must disregard the violation 
of the safety law, and simply decide whether the person acted 
with reasonable care under the circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. -2<* 
In the absence of reasonable cause to believe otherwise, 
every driver has a right to assume that other persons will obey 
the law and exercise reasonable care. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^7 
The law provides that any person driving a motor vehicle 
on a public highway shall keep a proper lookout. A "proper 
lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily 
careful person would use in light of all present conditions and 
those reasonably to be anticipated. 
A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and 
conditions in plain sight, to see that which is open and 
apparent and to realize obvious dangers. This duty does not 
merely require looking, but also requires observing and 
understanding other traffic and the general situation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2& 
Every driver has a duty to drive at a speed that is safe 
under the circumstances, with proper regard for existing and 
potential hazards. 
The posted speed limit at the place of this accident was 
55 miles per hour. This speed limit is reasonable in the 
absence of any special hazards. Speed in excess of the posted 
limit constitutes evidence of negligence. Regardless of the 
speed limit, all drivers must drive at an appropriate reduced 
speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when 
pedestrians are present, or when required to do so because of 
weather or other special highway conditions. 
